March 19, 2025

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[2308.11256] Efficient Last-iterate Convergence Algorithms in Solving Games


View a PDF of the paper titled Efficient Last-iterate Convergence Algorithms in Solving Games, by Linjian Meng and 8 other authors

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Abstract:To establish last-iterate convergence for Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithms in learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) of extensive-form games (EFGs), recent studies reformulate learning an NE of the original EFG as learning the NEs of a sequence of (perturbed) regularized EFGs. Consequently, proving last-iterate convergence in solving the original EFG reduces to proving last-iterate convergence in solving (perturbed) regularized EFGs. However, the empirical convergence rates of the algorithms in these studies are suboptimal, since they do not utilize Regret Matching (RM)-based CFR algorithms to solve perturbed EFGs, which are known the exceptionally fast empirical convergence rates. Additionally, since solving multiple perturbed regularized EFGs is required, fine-tuning across all such games is infeasible, making parameter-free algorithms highly desirable. In this paper, we prove that CFR$^+$, a classical parameter-free RM-based CFR algorithm, achieves last-iterate convergence in learning an NE of perturbed regularized EFGs. Leveraging CFR$^+$ to solve perturbed regularized EFGs, we get Reward Transformation CFR$^+$ (RTCFR$^+$). Importantly, we extend prior work on the parameter-free property of CFR$^+$, enhancing its stability, which is crucial for the empirical convergence of RTCFR$^+$. Experiments show that RTCFR$^+$ significantly outperforms existing algorithms with theoretical last-iterate convergence guarantees.

Submission history

From: Linjian Meng [view email]
[v1]
Tue, 22 Aug 2023 07:59:49 UTC (17,546 KB)
[v2]
Tue, 18 Mar 2025 08:31:00 UTC (1,091 KB)



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